Emergency response trolley crash: Runaway Trolley at North Rode
On Sunday, May 26, 2024, at approximately 05:00, a track trolley ran away downhill towards a group of track workers at North Rode, Cheshire. Fortunately, a site supervisor and a controller of site safety saw the trolley approaching at around 20 mph (32 km/h) and shouted a warning, providing enough time for staff in the site of work to get clear of the track.
The Accident
The trolley then collided with a piece of equipment within the site of work, causing damage to both the trolley and the work equipment. No one was hurt in the accident. The trolley was being used to transport equipment from a railway access point to the site of work.
Still on Emergency response trolley crash
Cause of the Runaway
The investigation found that the trolley became unbraked while it was on a downhill gradient after the operator had intentionally defeated the ‘failsafe’ function of the trolley’s braking system. The design of the trolley made it possible to do this, and the operator was aware that it was possible to defeat the brakes.
Ergonomic Issues
The ergonomics of the trolley brake system were found to be tiring to use, potentially encouraging the operator to defeat the brakes. Additionally, the operator was unaware of the risk of the trolley running away at this location, which has an average downhill gradient of 1 in 176.
Underlying Factors
The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) identified two underlying factors to the accident:
1. Product Acceptance Process: The product acceptance process employed by Network Rail did not manage the risks incurred by this design of trolley.
2. Lack of Clarity in Site Leadership Roles: A lack of clarity in site leadership roles led to risks not being effectively managed.
Probable Underlying Factor
A further probable underlying factor was that the defeating of the braking system on this type of trolley is a known issue, but no effective action had been taken to eliminate the practice.
Recommendations
As a result of its investigation, RAIB has made two recommendations, both addressed to Network Rail:
1. Reducing the Likelihood of Failsafe Brake Modification: Network Rail, in conjunction with the Rail Safety and Standards Board and the M&EE Networking Group, should reduce the likelihood of the failsafe brakes on trolleys of this type being modified by operators and rendered ineffective.
2. Improving Safety Learning Implementation: Network Rail should improve the implementation of safety learning resulting from accident and incident investigations.
Learning Points
Two learning points have been identified:
1. Importance of Effective Braking Systems: Staff should not render the braking system ineffective when working with trolleys of this type.
2. Role of Controllers of Site Safety: Controllers of site safety should accompany work groups to personally observe and advise them.
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